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Abstract
The politicization of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has manifested itself to different extents
across EU Member States. In some countries, conflicting interpretations about the deal were highly visible in public and
political debates, while in others there was hardly any awareness. To further understand this phenomenon, trade scholars
have to date not yet deepened nor leveraged the insights of the ‘differentiated politicization’ and social movement liter-
ature, which both point to coalition formation as an important trigger of politicization processes. This article contributes
to our understanding of variation in politicization across EU Member States, by exploring coalition formation dynamics in
differentiated politicization processes, in order to identify the factors facilitating successful domestic coalition formation.
Through an exploratory case study design, I focus on three countries that exemplify high, middle, and low politicization
cases: Germany, Belgium, and Ireland. By relying on the testimonies of campaigners active during the TTIP episode, I iden-
tify three elements that facilitated the formation of a diverse domestic coalition, which subsequently played an important
role in pushing for a broad-based debate about the implications of TTIP: (i) an expert ‘mesomobilization’ linkwith a transna-
tional advocacy network, (ii) the prior availability of domestic alliances, and (iii) an inclusive framing approach in order to
establish a diverse coalition. The findings also underline the importance of timing in the unfolding of (successful) politiciza-
tion processes.
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1. Introduction
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) has gone down in memory as the most politi-
cized EU trade negotiation to date. Between 2013 and
2016, political parties, NGOs, business groups, farm-
ers’ associations and citizen movements across Europe
were involved in an enduring public and political de-
bate about the opportunities and risks of such a transat-
lantic free trade agreement. That collective attention
turned to this particular deal was in part due to the far-
reaching market-(de)regulating nature of the deal, spark-
ing normative, value-based concerns, instead of purely
economic motivations (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2017;
Laursen & Roederer-Rynning, 2017). This combination of
the high ambitions of the negotiators, and the equally
strong politicization that followed in its wake, make TTIP
an extreme case that can illuminate new insights for
scholars studying the ever-deepening nature of EU trade
agreements, or the societal reaction it provokes.
From the latter point of view, one of the most strik-
ing observations about the TTIP episode is that notwith-
standing the overall unprecedented level of politicization
surrounding TTIP, it has been politicized to very differ-
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ent degrees across EU Member States (Gheyle, 2019;
Meunier & Czesana, 2019). Conflicting interpretations
about TTIP were highly visible in the public and political
spheres of Germany and Austria, were present to some
degree in France, the UK or Belgium, while there was
hardly any visible conflict in, for example, Ireland, Greece
or the Central and Eastern European countries.
EU trade policy scholars have to date, however, pre-
dominantly focused on the question why TTIP experi-
enced such a strong societal reaction, while other (even
parallel) trade agreements did not. Several factors are
identified, such as the far-reaching content of the deal
(De Bièvre & Poletti, 2017; De Ville & Siles-Brügge,
2017), the power symmetry with the negotiating part-
ner (Young, 2016), the broad and sustained activism of
civil society organizations (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2015;
Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2018), or the use of particular
framing, ‘myths’ and narratives (Buonanno, 2017; Duina,
2019). One exception is the study by Jedinger and Schoen
(2018), which focuses on differences in public opinion
(in particular anti-Americanism), which they neverthe-
less find to be moderated by issue awareness and politi-
cal framing, and therefore not in itself an explanation for
the differences observed.
This article aims to contribute to an understanding
of variation in politicization across EU Member States.
The theoretical starting point of the analysis is the litera-
ture on the ‘politicization of European integration,’ which
takes issue with the increasing and visible controversy
over the EU and its activities (de Wilde, 2011; Schmidt,
2019). This literature has made considerable steps to-
wards explaining differentiated politicization across time
and settings (de Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke, 2016).
One of its findings is that, given the actor-driven na-
ture of politicization processes, resource mobilization is
quintessential to expanding the scope of conflict (see
Zürn, 2018). By connecting this concept to social move-
ment and interest group literature, coalition formation
comes to the fore as a crucial element: By building al-
liances, a multitude of useful campaigning resources are
pooled/mobilized (expertise, experience, funding, staff,
reputation), essential to kick-start a durable mobilization
and politicization process (Crespy, 2016; Junk, 2019).
However, this insight has not yet been deepened,
nor leveraged in the study of the differentiated politi-
cization of TTIP. With coalition formation as a key ele-
ment in pushing politicization processes comes the ex-
pectation that different dynamics of coalition formation
should be related to different degrees of politicization
across contexts. The main goal of this article is there-
fore to explore coalition formation dynamics in three
EU Member States that experienced divergent levels of
politicization, in order to identify which factors account
for successful domestic coalition formation efforts and
subsequent politicization. To do that, I not only build
on the analysis of primary documents (joint position pa-
pers and website information), but especially rely on
the testimonies of activists and campaigners centrally in-
volved in themobilization against TTIP, based on 28 semi-
structured interviews.
As the aim is to generate new insights into the role
of coalition formation in domestic politicization dynam-
ics of EU trade agreements, the case study design is ex-
ploratory, and follows an abductive logic (Friedrichs &
Kratochwil, 2009). This means I start, in the next section,
by reviewing the concept of coalition formation within
the broader politicization and social movement litera-
ture, in order to generate suggestions about the factors
facilitating successful coalition formation in politicization
processes (Section 2). Section 3 explains the case selec-
tion and interview strategy of this exploratory case study
design. This is then followed by an empirical analysis
of the coalition formation dynamics in Germany, Ireland
and Belgium (Section 4). The discussion and conclusions
summarize the main findings and discuss how these can
serve as the basis for further research (Section 5).
2. Politicization and Domestic Coalition Formation
2.1. The Importance of Coalition Formation in
Politicization Processes
The politicization of the EU has been seminally defined
as “an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or
values and the extent to which they are publicly ad-
vanced towards the process of policy formulation within
the EU” (de Wilde, 2011, p. 566). While scholars have
rightly operationalized this as a multi-dimensional phe-
nomenon (Baglioni & Hurrelmann, 2016; Zürn, 2016), its
communicative or discursive manifestation is an often-
recurring feature. In this view, politicization can be seen
as characteristic of a public and political debate that com-
bines ‘visibility’ with ‘conflicting interpretations,’ usually
put forward by a variety of actors beyond EU executives
(de Wilde et al., 2016; Statham & Trenz, 2013). In other
words, EU politicization describes a process whereby
traditional backroom negotiations between (executive)
elites are accompanied by visible public and political de-
bates in parliaments, mass media or on the streets.
Crucially though, the politicization of an issue is
not an automatic process, but is driven by actors
who attempt to politicize something, by discursively
(re)inserting conflict or contingency surrounding a topic
where before there was none or too little (Palonen et al.,
2019). A politician, an NGO activist, or a citizen, can all
try to politicize an EU free trade agreement by arguing,
for example, that a deal is not about economic bene-
fits, but about democracy and transparency. Yet whether
this intervention will spark a broader public and politi-
cal debate where ‘markets’ and ‘democracy’ become the
main points of reference, depends on a variety of medi-
ating factors.
Recent contributions have therefore focused on the
‘black box’ of politicization dynamics: the process of
unfolding politicization. As politicization predominantly
takes place at domestic levels, this focus is especially rel-
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evant to account for differences across time and settings.
Contributions have converged around two broad cate-
gories that serve as mediating categories: ‘political op-
portunity structures’ and ‘resourcemobilization’ (Crespy,
2016; deWilde & Zürn, 2012; Zürn, 2016). In short, politi-
cization will unfold in contexts where resources are ‘mo-
bilized’ (pooled, activated, put forward publicly) in a set-
ting that is conducive for such mobilization to take place
and spill over to a wider audience.
This focus on resource mobilization connects the
politicization literature to social movement and interest
group studies, and the ‘resource mobilization theory’ in
particular. The key insight here is that the availability of
resources (be it material, financial, reputational or cul-
tural) enhances the probability that collective action will
occur, but only if coordination and strategic effort first
convert these into collective resources (McCarthy & Zald,
1977). While different modes of ‘access’ to resources ex-
ist, the creation of ‘organizational capacity’ ormovement
structures, is identified as the most important (Edwards
& McCarthy, 2007). By forming coalitions, organizations
and individuals pool financial resources, increase staff ef-
ficiency, exchange information, and decide on common
strategies and frames—dynamics that contribute to sus-
tained activism and subsequent politicization.
This finding is empirically corroborated in different
literatures. For example, several authors using the politi-
cization concept explicitly link this with coalition forma-
tion. Crespy (2016) argued that coalition formation is
the first step of an unfolding politicization process, and
empirically shows that the simultaneous activation of
transnational, supranational and domestic channels of
coalition formation has played a key role in politicizing EU
legislation on welfare market liberalization. Zürn (2018)
similarly finds that with respect to human rights provi-
sions in international organizations’ policies, it was those
challengers who built coalitions with legislative, judicial
or like-minded institutions (other organizations, states)
that succeeded in politicizing the issue, forcing conces-
sions of the organization.
Empirical studies on interest group lobbying equally
find that the existence of coalitions and their col-
lective framing efforts are decisive for lobbying suc-
cess or influence (Baumgartner & Mahoney, 2008; Junk
& Rasmussen, 2019). Moreover, in examples of con-
tentious trade negotiations in the past as well, coalition
formation has played a recurrent role in fueling politiciza-
tion. The ‘Battle of Seattle’ during the WTO Ministerial
Conference of 1999, for example, turned into a success-
ful mobilization only after divergent groups were able
to find common ground and form an event coalition
(Levi &Murphy, 2006). Successful cases of politicizing the
General Agreement on Trade in Services were equally re-
lated to the work of dense coalitions of activists (Crespy,
2016). Finally, the politicization and derailing of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Agreement equally suggests advocacy by
organized groups as essential (Crespy & Parks, 2017).
2.2. Determinants of Successful Coalition Formation
Following Crespy’s (2016) discursive institutionalist po-
sition, successful politicization efforts are shaped by
the necessity to rally the relevant allies in a given in-
stitutional setting. In post-Lisbon EU trade policy, the
European Parliament has de facto veto power over in-
ternational agreements at the end of a negotiation pro-
cess, while national parliaments need to ratify (‘mixed
agreement’) deals if they touch upon domestic compe-
tences. Given this power-sharing across levels, success-
fully politicizing TTIP therefore implies activating transna-
tional, supranational, and domestic channels of mobi-
lization and coalition formation. Combining social move-
ment, interest group and EUpoliticization literature, I put
forward three factors that come forward as facilitating
domestic coalition formation in this context, and push-
ing the politicization process.
First of all, social movement scholars put a particu-
lar emphasis on ‘mediating structures’ to explain success-
ful activation of resources (Staggenborg, 2002). So-called
‘mesomobilization actors’ are identified as the groups
(or individual actors) that coordinate and integrate mi-
cromobilization groups (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992). They
are actors who take up the coordination and organiza-
tional integration of different groups that are engaged
with an issue. The effectiveness of such actors is usually
correlated with their prior experience in mobilizing or
coordinating tasks. In case of high domestic TTIP politi-
cization, we therefore expectmesomobilization actors to
have played an important coordinating role at the domes-
tic level.
Secondly, the prior availability of networks may also
play an important role. Pre-existing links and alliances of-
ten get picked up (again) when the need arises. If coali-
tion formation still needs to occur after negotiations
have already begun, there may be a missed opportunity
to weigh in on the terms of the debate. Again, exam-
ples from the trade literature confirm this point. Walter
(2001) argued that “it is difficult to understand NGO op-
position to the Millennium Round agenda in Seattle in
1999 without addressing their opposition to and mo-
bilization against the MAI [Multilateral Agreement on
Investment]” (p. 52). Von Bülow (2010) equally found
that anti-trade coalition building in Central and North
America in the 1990s was more sustainable when ac-
tors could build on pre-existing social networks, reper-
toires, and resources. In Europe as well, a core group of
organizations has been involved in several mobilization
episodes (Crespy, 2014).
Thirdly, coalitions can probably politicize issues more
effectively when they link a diverse set of organizations
together, as this pools different types of expertise, repu-
tations, political links andmobilization potential. To allow
for such heterogeneous coalition building, issue fram-
ing plays a crucial role by altering the nature and scope
of potential overlap (Levi & Murphy, 2006). Moreover,
Gerhards and Rucht (1992) found that it is often the task
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of the mesomobilization actors to provide the ‘cultural
glue’ of coalitions by elaborating collective action frames
binding groups together. This is especially important for
advocacy coalitions that link unusual partners (such as
trade unions and social movements), or organizations
with different objectives (Benford & Snow, 2000; Keck &
Sikkink, 1998).
3. Research Design
This study uses an exploratory (theory-building) case
study design in order to identify the factors that facil-
itated successful coalition formation across divergent
politicization paths (Rohlfing, 2012). The research ap-
proach taken is abductive, which implies that I started
by using existing, related, literature as a guide for what
we could expect to find, leaving room for rich empirical
analysis to further inform these (Friedrichs & Kratochwil,
2009). Case selection in exploratory and abductive re-
search designs often follows a ‘(most-)typical’ or ‘most-
interesting’ logic (Friedrichs&Kratochwil, 2009; Rohlfing,
2012), which means I am interested in three cases that
differ on the outcome (degree of politicization high, mid-
dle, low), while serving as interesting or exemplary cases
for each of these categories.
Nonetheless, the measurement of politicization pro-
cesses or degrees is notoriously complicated, not only
because the concept tries to tie together different so-
cietal dynamics, such as public opinion awareness, me-
dia visibility, parliamentary debates, or protest events
(de Wilde, 2011), but also because scholars differ in the
way they conceptualize politics and politicization (see,
e.g., Palonen et al., 2019). Any comparison based on
a single measurement will therefore always be a con-
tentious choice.
Building on a broader project focusing on TTIP politi-
cization dynamics in different countries (Gheyle, 2019),
I have therefore attempted to address this problem by
following a step-wise strategy, combining different par-
tial indicators in order to justify case selection. First,
building on the assumption that differences in the in-
tensity of the anti-TTIP campaign are the most likely ex-
planation for the variation in opposition to TTIP (Young,
2017), I rely on public opinion data about variation
in opposition against TTIP to make a first distinction.
Table 1 of the Supplementary File gives an overview of
(changes in the) support and opposition levels across all
EU Member States.
Germany and Austria stand out as the countries with
the highest shares of opposition against TTIP, which fur-
ther deteriorate over time. This is in line with several
scholarly and practitioners’ assessments of Germany as
the most politicized case (e.g., Chan & Crawford, 2017).
Given Germany’s pivotal function in the EU, and its tra-
ditional support for EU trade deals, this is therefore a
typical and interesting case of high politicization. On the
other side of the spectrum, Ireland stands out as the
only case with extremely high support levels, which even
increase over time, suggesting very low levels of politi-
cization. Moreover, its historical position and links with
the US make this an equally interesting case to focus on.
Lastly, as a ‘middle-range’ case, Belgium was chosen, pri-
marily given the divergences between the two regions,
Flanders andWallonia, which both showed declining lev-
els of support over time, yet started from a respectively
high and medium level. These different experiences be-
tween two regions with far-reaching powers in interna-
tional negotiations makes for an interesting comparison
of coalition dynamics (Bollen, De Ville, & Gheyle, 2020).
As a second step, I calculated ‘politicization indices’
for each of the three (four) cases. Through a quantitative
media content analysis, I extracted so-called ‘core sen-
tences’ from articles on the TTIP topic (Gheyle, 2019).
These sentences include evaluations of TTIP uttered by
an actor, with a certain frame attached to it. I aggre-
gated these data into indicators of ‘salience,’ ‘actor ex-
pansion’ and ‘polarization’ (key indicators of politiciza-
tion, see deWilde et al., 2016), and combined these into
one politicization index with the formula ‘salience × (ac-
tor expansion + polarization).’ Figure 1 plots these in-
dices over time, which again shows that Germany was
a standout politicization case from the very beginning
of negotiations. Politicization in Wallonia (according to
this partial indicator) only took off in early 2015 but then
remained at a relatively high level, before peaking late
2016. The trajectories of Ireland and Flanders are quanti-
tatively rather similar, with two peaks in early 2015 and
late 2016.
But again this indicator was unable to capture every-
thing, especially neglecting several political and parlia-
mentary dynamics. Further qualitative evidence of the
amount and content of parliamentary debates showed
that Flanders could be classified as relatively more politi-
cized than Ireland (where hardly any political party con-
testationwas registered), while inWallonia andGermany,
there was a lot of debate on the topic, in line with the
above observations (Bollen et al., 2020; Gheyle, 2019).
All in all, I am confident that the cases of Germany,
Wallonia, Flanders, and Ireland, can be depicted as high,
middle-high, middle-low, and low cases of politicization,
respectively.
To gain information and a deeper understanding of
what facilitated domestic coalition formation in these
countries, I built on a diverse range of written sources
(such as position papers or website information), but es-
pecially relied on testimonies of activists and campaign-
ers heavily involved in the TTIP campaign. They are well-
placed not only to describe (internal) coalition-building
dynamics, but also to evaluate the significance hereof in
the broader scheme of things. In total, I conducted 28
semi-structured interviews with civil society representa-
tives in the three countries, in the period 2015–2016. For
the current purposes (and reasons of scope), only a se-
lection of key interviews is referenced. References to the
numerical interviews below can be found in the online
supplementary file.
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Figure 1. Politicization indices over time for Germany, Ireland, Flanders and Wallonia. Source: Own elaboration (Gheyle,
2019).
4. Analysis
4.1. Transnational and Supranational Connections
In the EU trade policy domain, the so-called ‘Seattle 2
Brussels’ (S2B) network is the main transnational advo-
cacy coalition that has been actively following trade is-
sues since the 1999 Seattle demonstrations against the
WTO (Interview 1). It is made up of activists who repre-
sent different (domestic) organizations, aligned by their
values and commitment to challenge the (in their eyes)
corporate-driven agenda of the EU. While its member-
ship has fluctuated over the years (mirroring the general
attention for trade policy), the core group of members
are activist veterans who have been involved in various
contentious trade episodes (Interview 2).
Over the years, they have particularly taken up more
complex trade topics (which not necessarily drew much
public attention) such as trade in services or investment
protection (Interview 3). This continuous involvement
has therefore not only resulted in long-standing coordi-
nation experience, but also in a significant build-up of ex-
pertise related to both the (technical) content of agree-
ments, and the way to communicate this to a broader au-
dience. Given the way in which TTIP built upon previous
trade and investment agreements, these activists could
hence foresee the direction wherein several elements
would go (Interview 4). As one interviewee argued: “The
moment TTIP took off in 2013, all the material, the dis-
course, everything on investment and ISDS [Investor–
State Dispute Settlement] was ready” (Interview 1).
As the core network working on trade, they took
up a coordinating role, and decided early on that this
campaign against TTIP should be pan-European from the
start (Interview 2). They were, in retrospect, mesomobi-
lization actors at transnational level, responsible for con-
vening meetings, facilitating information exchange, and
establishing e-mail lists. While they had no intention to
coordinate everymessage or action, they still “invested a
lot of time and capacity in trying to hold [everything] to-
gether somehow…to make sure that you’re not running
in completely different directions” (Interview 4).
Given that its members are national organizations,
the S2B-link throughdomestic groupswas acknowledged
as an important element in the early mobilization in
some EU Member States: “At least in Belgium, the
Netherlands, Germany, France, the UK and Spain, it is ex-
tremely clear that it were S2B members that kick-started
the process and also built alliances that were bigger”
(Interview 2). While activists hesitated to assign causal-
ity, and argued S2B-members were not solely responsi-
ble for the start nor successfulness of domestic politiciza-
tion, they were nevertheless heavily involved in spear-
heading the movement domestically.
While S2B is in essence a network of trade experts
who are engaged in policy and communication work, a
second (but related) transnational alliance formed dur-
ing the TTIP negotiations. The ‘STOP TTIP’ Alliance was
established somewhere around March 2014, initially in
the context of a European Citizens Initiative in order
to collect signatures for a petition to stop TTIP. Over
time their raison d’être evolved towards becoming the
main ‘mobilization pillar’ of the anti-TTIP movement, re-
sponsible for coordinating pan-European events such as
the ‘European Days of Action against TTIP’ (Interview 5).
Similar to S2B members who were focal points of do-
mestic campaigns, national STOP TTIP coordinators op-
erated as the main contact points around which national
networks were established, in order to work towards
demonstrations and actions.
Lastly, besides these trade or TTIP-specific alliances,
there were obviously many ‘supranational’ groups
following the negotiations in the EU bubble. The
most prominent in this campaign were the European
Consumers Organization, the European Trade Union
Confederation (the umbrella of trade unions), and a vari-
ety of environmental organizations such as Friends of the
Earth or Greenpeace. While doing injustice to the intrica-
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cies of alliances and networks at EU level, the key thing
to note here is that all these organizations equally have
domestic links in different EU Member States.
4.2. Germany
Having multiple German links to the S2B-network seems
to be one of the main reasons of early German con-
testation against TTIP. In April 2013 (three months be-
fore negotiations started) about 20 NGOs were already
meeting to exchange information about the upcoming
transatlantic deal (Interviews 4 and 6). The meeting was
organized by two S2B-members (CEO and PowerShift)
and Campact, a group whose expertise lies in amplify-
ing (online) campaigns. Several other attendees such
as ATTAC Germany, GermanWatch or Forum Umwelt &
Entwicklung, were all S2B members, and were hence all
very much aware of the (in their view) dangers of the
evolving trade agenda.
This group organized several outreach events to raise
awareness, and to provide expert training in order to
draw more organizations in. Several existing organiza-
tional links were activated here, which had evolved nat-
urally, or because of earlier campaigns. Many German
environmental and food safety organizations, for exam-
ple, have allied closely in the past during food safety
campaigns (Miltner, Maier, Pfetsch, & Waldherr, 2013).
During these trainings, the German ‘mesomobilization’
actors taking the lead were CEO, PowerShift and Forum
Umwelt & Entwicklung. They were responsible for coor-
dination, education, and producing the first position pa-
pers of the coalition. Testimony of their early work is that
on 17 June 2013—the day negotiationswere officially an-
nounced at a G8 meeting—a paper with the title TTIP
nein danke was already made public.
The demands in this paper were incredibly detailed,
which is testimony of the professionalization and ex-
pertise flowing in the network through different ex-
pert groups (working on fracking, pesticides, or the
REACH-regulation, for example). This is an element an
S2B-interviewee identified as key to the early German
mobilization, much less prominent in other countries
(interview 2). Moreover, demands were also very di-
verse: nearly every frame, and every type of concern that
was raised during the 3-year campaign was already ad-
dressed herein.
In order to get different organizations in line, fram-
ing apparently played an important role, as testified
by one interviewee: “Groups very much shape the dis-
course, the frame, but this also shapes the movement
in the way that it organizes” (Interview 4). This is re-
flected, for example, in the name the coalition gave itself:
‘TTIP UnfairHandelbar,’ which can loosely be translated
as “TTIP should not be up for negotiation.” The ‘unfair’
part, however, also makes the name ambiguous enough
so that more moderate organizations can claim to cam-
paign for ‘reforming’ TTIP,while still being included in the
wider coalition.
As online andmassmedia salience grew as a result of
the coalitions’ early actions, the ‘TTIP Unfairhandelbar’
coalition grew from 20 to 50 members. Most of these
were environmental, alter-globalization, food safety, and
development groups, who were closely aligned with the
Green and Far-Left political parties, which explains some
of the early parliamentary activity in the Bundestag. All in
all, German activists acknowledged the vital importance
of these coalition formation efforts in the first months.
As one interviewee summarized:
For Germany it’s actually really clear: It was an early
mover advantage…the fact that you had a coali-
tion, that you had a strong narrative with ISDS,
the Vattenfall cases, and also organizations like
Greenpeace Germany who did very early research
on the agenda of the US agribusiness lobby for TTIP.
(Interview 4)
Multiple transnational links to S2B (where the trade
expertise resided), pre-existing alliances (combining all
types of resources), and inclusiveness in framing all
played an important role in this early coalition formation.
Still, the biggest and most prominent ‘expansion’
came when groups with a more ‘reformist’ stance
teamed up. The German trade unions in particular
(through their umbrella organization DGB [Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund]) were widely identified as playing
a huge role in further politicizing TTIP (Interviews 3, 4,
and 6). The public salience and some skeptical union sec-
tions forced DGB to make their concerns public, which
they did with their ‘red-line approach’ by mid-2014
(Interview 7). This reformist stance initially precluded
close cooperation with ‘TTIP Unfairhandelbar,’ as it did
not fit with their rejectionist undertone. The solution
again lay in framing and coalition formation. The unions
and the existing coalition decided to establish a separate,
and larger, ‘demonstration coalition’ under the (loosely
translated) banner ‘Stop TTIP—For fair trade.’ This fram-
ing was again inclusive (or ambiguous) enough to house
groups aiming to reject or reform TTIP (Interviews 4
and 7).
While the demo coalition proved convenient to bring
a heterogeneous alliance of groups together on the
streets (such as cultural, religious or small and medium-
sized enterprises organizations), the newly made al-
liances were consequential for others as well. The main
German consumer organization (Verbraucherzentrale
Bundesverband, VZBV), for example, made its own criti-
cal analyses based on its connections with the European
Consumers Organization. Still, the red-line position by
the unions was very similar to theirs, which led to a
joint DGB–VZBV position in July 2014 (Interview 8). The
pooled reputation of these groups not only legitimated
the concerns about TTIP in the public eye, but it also
opened up additional access to more centrist social-
democratic and Christian-democratic parties, making
TTIP a concern for almost the entire political spectrum.
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4.3. Ireland
The main Irish coalition against TTIP formed under the
banner of the ‘TTIP Information Network.’ This was ini-
tially brought together by activists from ATTAC Ireland
and Comhlamh (an umbrella organization for volunteers
active in North–South development work). While both
these organizations had some in-house expertise, fo-
cusing on these two is characteristic for the network
as a whole. First of all, this network was quite small
(10–15 members), with participants mostly present as
volunteers rather than as full-time representatives for
their organizations. As one interviewee put it: “It was
a very heavy workload amongst quite a small group of
civil society organizations. Very intense couple of years
for people who did this in their own time” (Interview 9).
Secondly, the two ‘founding’ groups do not have a
long-standing relationship, nor are they embedded in
lively networks building on other campaigns. Irish civil
society is in general not particularly large, with orga-
nizations having to strategically focus on certain top-
ics instead of campaigning on everything (Interviews
9 and 10). This often precludes additional time invest-
ments in networks to follow shared topics, especially on
topics such as trade which did not attract attention for a
long time. Hence, when TTIP took off, there was hardly
any organization actively working on EU trade policy
(Interview 11). So, while the TTIP Information Network
did eventually manage to bring a variety of individuals
together, organizations themselves long hesitated to in-
vest much in it.
This volunteer-driven network therefore not only
struggled with a lack of time and financial resources,
but also a lack of expertise. Training was mostly pro-
vided by individuals with some expertise (partly built up
through transnational links), but this remained quite lim-
ited (Interviews 9 and 11). There were no existing links at
the time with S2B, for example, which meant that iden-
tification and awareness raising was not timely, nor was
there much knowledge in terms of content and framing
to draw on. In other words, much of the coalition forma-
tion and build-up of expertise still had to take off by the
time negotiations were well underway.
Even during coalition formation, members of the net-
work acknowledged several problems. There was a lot of
disagreement on the type of actions to be taken, or how
to present TTIP to a broader public. An interviewee ar-
gued: “It seemed to me that the meetings took place be-
tween different groups who each wanted to oppose TTIP
on the basis of their own interest and concerns, rather
than have a unified strategy” (Interview 12). One idea
was to frame TTIP related to agriculture, which in the
Irish context could have struck a chord, “but it didn’t
go that way, people wanted to campaign on their own
grounds” (Interview 11). Another activist did not only
blame a lack of willingness, but also the complexity of
TTIP, citing a multitude of entry points into the debate
as a stumbling block (Interview 9). A lack of expertise
on how to communicate these trade issues thus again
played a role.
These problems of getting an inclusive framing were
echoed in the evaluation that there was no central steer-
ing group, or at least a full-time coordinator or com-
munications officer (Interview 9). With respect to gain-
ing media coverage, for example, groups argued they
knew beforehand this would be difficult in the Irish con-
text, but “to criticize ourselves though, we never had
any organized media strategy. It was all ad hoc efforts”
(Interview 12). All in all, these volunteers concluded that
“it was a small group, it wasn’t all that well-organized and
it did what it could in quite an ad hocway” (Interview 12).
Later in the campaign, by 2015, therewere additional
developments that amplified the message of the TTIP
InformationNetwork. For one, the campaign got to some
extent linked to broader (and more successful) social
movement campaigns against privatizing water distribu-
tion (Interview11). In addition, the Irish trade unions and
an organization called ‘Uplift’ joined the opposition, of
which the latter helped grass-roots mobilization through
‘TTIP-free zones’ or social media campaigns. Also, the
Irish section of the pan-European Stop TTIP was set up.
All these additional links added certain tactics, mobiliza-
tion power, or legitimacy that the initial coalition lacked
to some extent (Interview 13).
4.4. Belgium
Belgian politics is characterized by a divide between
the Dutch-speaking (Flanders) and French-speaking
(Wallonia) regions, which was no different during the
TTIP episode. Coalition building and anti-TTIP campaigns
to some extent evolved separately, butmany links still ex-
ist across the language barrier. The best example hereof
is the twin (Flanders–Wallonia) umbrella organization
‘11.11.11–CNCD,’ a North–South development organiza-
tion that brings together about 60–90 NGOs, (sections
of) unions, and smaller associations. They are the only
Belgian members of S2B, with interviewees confirming
their importance in kick-starting the campaign in both
Flanders and Wallonia (Interviews 3 and 14).
In Flanders, 11.11.11 acted as the main mesomobi-
lization actor, trying to bring together different Flemish
organizations, providing training, and doing much of
the early (inside) lobbying work. It was able to build
on an existing ‘Decent Work’ alliance together with
the unions and a handful of global justice organiza-
tions. Nonetheless, it took a while (until May 2014) be-
fore this coalition came out strongly on TTIP, mainly
because of the (Flemish) unions’ hesitance to be per-
ceived as anti-trade (Interview 15). They were more in
line with the constructive ‘red line’ position favored by
the European Trade Union Confederation. An intervie-
wee from 11.11.11 acknowledged that they made sev-
eral compromises and came out much less rejectionist
as they wanted to be, in order to get to a joint position
(Interview 3).
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InWallonia, CNCD played a similar role as in Flanders,
but here, there were several other (mobilization) net-
works already active in awareness raising and mobiliza-
tion, which they were able to build on. First, there was
the platform ‘No Transat,’ originally established by two
researcher-activists back in 2009 (who started anticipat-
ing what a transatlantic free trade deal would look like).
Between 2011–2013, they were vital in raising aware-
ness with other organizations, with several interviewees
attributing the early Walloon mobilization to their in-
volvement (Interviews 14 and 16). Secondly, the mobi-
lization of the ‘D19–20 Alliance’ (originally established
by concerned milk producers who saw the need of link-
ing their concerns with other civil society actors) brought
a very heterogeneous alliance on the streets, turning its
attention to TTIP. Many vocal and more radical sections
of Walloon unions were part of both these networks, ac-
counting for a muchmore militant stance of theWalloon
unions. One Walloon activist also recalled that all these
coalitions worked together with the idea of a common
project: “Everyone had its own institutional affiliation,
but nobody tried to make the debate exclusively about
him or herself” (Interview 16).
In 2015, a second round of coalition formation took
place that was more geared towards cross-regional links.
On the one hand there was a joining of forces of the ‘ex-
pert’ pillars that existed in both Flanders and Wallonia,
culminating in the ‘4 May Coalition.’ This linked the
Decent Work coalition together with a list of organi-
zations that had hardly worked on EU trade policy ex-
plicitly before (or at least not recently): health insur-
ance funds, consumer groups, and environmental orga-
nizations. The coalition boasted that this was the en-
tire Belgian civil society joined together, and intervie-
wees acknowledged that pooling resources was impor-
tant at that point: Health insurance and consumer groups
greatly added to the legitimacy of the ‘Stop TTIP’ mes-
sage, while they themselves couldmore efficiently follow
and learn about negotiations (Interviews 17 and 18).
Again, inclusive framing was raised as essential to
bring very different groups together. An interviewee
from 11.11.11 argued:
We have stronger stances on trade policy than the
consumers, for example, but we don’t have prob-
lems to ally with them in a coalition where they can
recognize themselves in. Eventually that became a
broad coalition that also says ‘Stop TTIP,’ but that does
not mean they go as far in their rejection as we do.
(Interview 3)
On the other hand, by the end of 2015, a national
and much broader ‘Stop TTIP–CETA coalition’ was es-
tablished, along the same lines as the ‘demonstration
coalition’ in Germany. This brought the more institution-
alized groups together with the (mostly Walloon) mo-
bilization networks of D19–20, and other social move-
ments such as Hart Boven Hard (fighting austerity) and
the Climate Coalition. For this, CNCD acted as the meso-
mobilization actor to coordinate demonstration and ac-
tions, building on the loose network that was brought to-
gether under the Belgian pillar of the Stop TTIP European
Citizens’ Initiative (Interview 14). Especially for Flemish
organizations this was a welcome step as they could
now use the ‘tools’ and coalitions that had evolved on
the Walloon side (Interview 3). Very different groups
were aligned here, with one interviewee stating they had
many meetings to establish the message: “And the com-
promise between ‘no’ and ‘suspend’ was ‘stop,’ because
stop doesn’t mean no” (Interview 14).
In 2016 finally, additional structure was added to this
broad coalition, transforming it into the ‘Stop TTIP &
CETA Alliance.’ It is not entirely clear how the different
structures differed fromeach other (there aremany over-
laps in membership and actions), but at the very least
thiswasmarketed as the first ‘national’ platformbridging
all Flemish and Walloon groups, and giving more struc-
ture to the demonstration coalition that was established
before. This alliance undertook several smaller actions
during summer, leading up to a climax in September
2016, when between 10,000–15,000 people took to the
streets of Brussels protesting against both TTIP and CETA.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In this contribution, I have explored domestic coalition
formation dynamics in the differentiated politicization of
TTIP. By collecting testimonies from German, Irish and
Belgian civil society activists, and analyzing campaignma-
terial and website information, I was able to identify and
further qualify three domestic coalition-facilitating fac-
tors, which greatly helped to kick-start the TTIP issue
in the domestic public debate, hence signifying its role
and importance.
First, I expected a prominent role for mesomobiliza-
tion actors as crucial organizing and coordinating cogs.
The findings confirm the importance of groups taking the
lead, especially those with a close interconnectedness
to transnational or supranational trade networks. Both
in Germany and Belgium, domestic campaigns were kick-
started by mesomobilization actors who were active in,
or had access to expertise of trade campaigning through,
the S2B-network. In Ireland, the lack of any such connec-
tion meant that there was a relatively late awareness of
the issue, and a knowledge deficit of how to campaign
on such large trade agreements. One idiosyncrasy fur-
ther qualifying this finding, is the Walloon case of very
early awareness raising by one organization (NoTransat),
which already alerted other (mobilization) groups be-
fore negotiations took off. This emphasizes the expertise-
dimension in this mesomobilization success, corroborat-
ing a finding by Crespy (2016) that politicization “consists
to a large extent of the empowerment of contentious ac-
tors with expertise, and the use of expertise and com-
munication to translate technical problems into political
arguments aimed at mobilizing support” (p. 19).
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Secondly, pre-existing alliances allow for a reactiva-
tion of earlier cooperation, while bringing together a di-
verse set of expertise andmobilization power. This is true
in any case for the S2B-network on a transnational level,
showcasing the importance of sustaining alliances in be-
tween campaigns. In Germany and Belgium as well, civil
society organizations are embedded in dense networks,
with several existing alliances building on a variety of past
campaigns. The variety of groups linked in this way, in
combination with early mesomobilization efforts, made
an early and thorough condemnation of TTIP possible in
Germany and Wallonia. In Flanders, mobilization poten-
tial was added especially after linking with Walloon part-
ners, while in Ireland a small and scattered civil society
encountered several hurdles associated with coming to
terms with a new topic and new alliances, which always
remained a volunteer-driven alliance.
Lastly, mesomobilization actors played another cru-
cial role by being flexible and inclusive in framing TTIP,
and getting a minimal level of understanding and com-
mitment of all coalition members. This resulted in three
significant developments. First of all, in Germany and
Wallonia, mobilization was able to take off quickly as
many agreed on how to frame TTIP, and what the ulti-
mate goalwas. In Flanders, this process tookmuch longer
(given the hesitance of trade unions), while in Ireland this
was never resolved. Secondly, inclusive framing equally
played a role later on, when more groups joined the
bandwagon and started focusing on TTIP: Only when
agreement on the message and institutional dynamics
(see the ‘demonstration coalition’) was found, did mo-
bilization surge, fueling politicization. Thirdly, flexible is-
sue framing means that groups with substantial exper-
tise and those with mobilization power could be brought
together, a useful combination in order to focus on inside
and outside lobbying channels simultaneously.
One common thread in these observations is tim-
ing. What these existing alliances (domestically, supra-
or transnationally) and flexible ways of presenting con-
cerns have especially facilitated is an early mover advan-
tage. Besides the ferocity with which claims can be put
forward, or the overall legitimacy a coalition has by being
diverse, these timing-related elements of coalition for-
mation especially contributed to a rapid kick-off of the
debate, putting the burden of counter-framing the TTIP
topic on the actor that comes in second, and who needs
to convince an increasingly skeptical audience of the ben-
efits of TTIP.
Such an observation is also important in order to
identify the next steps of uncovering and/or explaining
politicization processes. By no means is the conclusion
here that coalition formation dynamics is the only impor-
tant factor to consider in what is, by definition, a com-
plex phenomenon that can materialize through different
pathways (think, for example, of media culture, political
party constellations, or public sentiments towards nego-
tiating partner, as other possible factors). Yet it suggests
that in a multi-causal explanation of politicization, do-
mestic coalition patterns will probably play a significant
role, which we can either use as part of (time-sensitive)
causal mechanisms uncovered through process-tracing,
or as a condition in a qualitative comparative analysis.
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